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ABSTRACT. The IVEX Dam (Chagrin River, northeastern Ohio) failed catastrophically on 13 August 1994,
releasing 38,000 m3 (about 10 million gallons) of impounded water and sediment. This event was
triggered by a 70-year rainfall event (13.54 cm of rainfall within 24-hours), resulting in flows 1.9 m
above the top of the spillway and impinging on the top of the dam. The failure was the result of seepage
piping at the toe of the dam, near the masonry spillway-earthen dam contact. Eyewitnesses reported
that collapse of the seepage pipe created a breach in the dam that rapidly downcut. Paleohydrologic
modeling suggests peak discharge through the breach was about 466 m'sec"1, substantially dewatering
the reservoir in approximately 2-3 minutes.
The effects of failure included erosion, flooding, and sedimentation downstream, and erosion of
fine-grained sediment within the reservoir itself. Of the accumulated reservoir sediment, 9-13% was
mobilized by dam breach and consequent incision (as the Chagrin River re-established its gradient
by downcutting through reservoir sediment). Of this amount, 61-86% was trapped in a downstream
reservoir (threatening the integrity of this structure).
The failure of this dam can be attributed to a large hydrologic event and the combination of several
factors: 1) inadequate spillway design, 2) lack of an emergency spillway, 3) 86% loss of permanent
pool capacity due to 152 years of sedimentation, and 4) poor dam maintenance resulting in seepage
piping failure. Similar dam failures will become an increasing societal problem, due to the aging of
the nation's 75,591 larger dams and reservoirs, of which 95% are privately owned and operated.
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INTRODUCTION
It is well known that construction of a dam and
reservoir on a river will cause significant changes in the
hydrology, sedimentology, and ecology of that fluvial
system (Gottschalk 1964; Baxter 1977; Petts 1977;
Simons 1979; Cooke and others 1993). There are 75,591
dams in the United States taller than about 7.6 m, or
impounding more than 61,650 m3 (Costa 1988; FEMA
1999). Although the public tends to think of the huge
federal projects in western US as examples of dams, in
fact 95% of the dams in the US are smaller structures
that are privately owned and operated.
Dams are constructed for specific purposes, such as
hydropower, hydroelectric power, navigation, flood
control, water source, or recreation. In some cases multiple
use is possible, but not all uses are compatible. For
example, locks and dams for navigation purposes are
managed for constant pool elevations, while water
source reservoirs are managed to maximize pool height,
but flood control structures are managed to minimize
pool heights (in order to accommodate flood storage).
Many of the nation's older dams and reservoirs have
changed in their primary purpose over time, commonly
a change from hydropower to other uses.
Dams and reservoirs create liabilities as well as bene-
fits. Earthquakes, floods, landslides, and volcanic activity
have resulted in catastrophic dam failures in a variety of
environments (Gupta and Rastogi 1976). In the US, 318
people have been killed by dam failures between 1960-
'Manuscript received 30 June 1999 and in revised form 14 Feb-
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1997 (FEMA 1999). In other instances, reservoirs such
as Lake Nasser (behind the Aswan High Dam on the
Nile River) have resulted in evaporative water loss, sa-
linization, loss to groundwater recharge, and the spread
of human disease via vectors that established habitat in
the reservoir (Waddy 1975).
Aside from such dramatic examples of liabilities,
often the most significant problems are incremental, re-
sulting from changes in sediment budgets (Gottschalk
1964; McHenry 1974; Baxter 1977; Petts 1984; Ford
1990; Thornton 1990). It is a well-documented geomor-
phological concept that dams and reservoirs create a
temporary baselevel for the fluvial system (Leopold
1956; Leopold and others 1964). This change in the
longitudinal profile of the stream gradient results in the
deposition of bedload as a delta that progrades across
the reservoir, and in the deposition of a significant
portion of the suspended load as fine-grained sedi-
ments which settle in the distal portion of the reservoir
(Gottschalk 1964; Petts 1984; Cogollo and Villela 1988).
Bed and bank erosion downstream of the dam is a
natural consequence of the stream adjusting to steep-
ened gradients and low initial sediment load after
exiting the reservoir (Gregory and Park 1974; Dolan and
others 1974; Simons 1979; Andrews 1986). Flow regulation
and changes in sediment loads in the reservoir and
downstream can have biological effects (changing sub-
strate in critical fisheries habitat and growth of plankton
in the reservoir) and chemical effects (changing nutrient
loads, dissolved oxygen content, and temperature of
the water) which jointly affect stream ecosystems
(Dolan and others 1974; Baxter 1977; Sale and others
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1982; Petts 1984; Carling 1995; Wilcock and others 1996).
As reservoir sedimentation occurs, the storage capac-
ity of the reservoir declines. Depending on its outflow
type, many reservoirs can be subdivided into permanent
pool storage (the reservoir volume below the spillway
elevation) and flood storage (the reservoir volume be-
tween spillway elevation and the top of the dam).
Sedimentation results in loss of permanent pool storage.
The ability of a reservoir to attenuate (delay and reduce
the magnitude of) a floodwave is a function of storage
volume and of inflow-outflow relationships (for example,
Haan and others 1994).
If a dam has an adequate spillway design to safely
handle the "Probable Maximum Flood" (PMF), as de-
termined by hydrograph records or by hydrologic
models, then loss of storage capacity should not directly
impact the safety of the structure. This is true of recently
constructed dams, which also usually incorporate an
emergency spillway design into the structure as addi-
tional protection against failure.
However, many of the older dams in the US predate
these types of hydrologic design. In such cases, the
worse case scenario is a situation where inflow greatly
exceeds outflow (inadequate spillway design) and there
is no emergency spillway. In this worse case scenario,
pool stage height in the reservoir could rise to the point
of overtopping the dam, or causing such elevated
hydrostatic pressures as to facilitate seepage piping
failure. In such cases, the safety of the structure depends
entirely on attenuation of the floodwave by storage
within the reservoir. Storage capacity loss is a long-term
progressive process, in the absence of sediment man-
agement, making the dam increasingly vulnerable to
failure during a high-magnitude flood event. Big Tujunga
dam in southern California lost 70% of its storage capac-
ity over a four year interval, due to heavy sediment
loads, with the consequence that floodwaves now pass
across the spillway only slightly attenuated by the res-
ervoir (Scott 1973). In smaller reservoirs in the Garza-
Little Elm basin of Texas, storage capacity loss has re-
duced attenuation from 10% to less than 1% (Gilbert
and Sauer 1970). During Tropical Storm Alberto (July
1994), over 200 dams failed in Georgia as a consequence
of the processes discussed here (FEMA 1999).
Loss of storage capacity also affects other uses for the
reservoir (for hydroelectric power, navigation, water
storage, fisheries, or recreation). Such loss can be miti-
gated in several ways. One way is to over-design the
size of the reservoir, so that years are added to the life
of the structure. A second solution is clever hydrologic
design to minimize the trapping efficiency of the struc-
ture, utilizing the reservoir size, shape, depth, internal
circulation, and sluicing of bottom water through the
dam (Brune 1953; Haan and others 1994). A third solu-
tion is to dredge the reservoir at various times, but this
can be costly, especially if the sediments are contam-
inated with pesticide residues or heavy metals requiring
special disposal (Cooke and others 1993).
According to recent surveys, there are about 9,200
dams in the US classed as high hazard, because of the in-
adequate spillway design, lack of emergency spillways,
and absence of sediment management. About 35% of
these dams have not had safety inspections in over 10
years (FEMA 1999). The I VEX dam was one such
example—over its 152-year history sediment accumu-
lated unchecked, thus there had been 86% permanent
pool storage capacity loss by 1994, when the dam failed
during a significant flood. Whereas other studies have
focused on the environmental impacts of constructing
and maintaining dams, the purpose of this report is to
evaluate the effects of dam failure, in what may become
a common scenario as the nation's dams age.
BACKGROUND
Hydrology and Geology
The IVEX dam is located near the Village of Chagrin
Falls, on the Chagrin River, in northeast Ohio (Fig. 1).
The Chagrin River has a total drainage area of 428 km2,
of which 87.7 km2 is located upstream of the IVEX
reservoir. The Chagrin River basin is part of the Alle-
gheny Plateau, and has maximum dimensions 48 km
north-south by 27 km east-west. The river has two major
tributaries (the Aurora Branch and East Branch) which
join the main river downstream of the dam. Total stream
length is 79 km, and the dam is located at river kilo-
meter (RK) 48.75. Downstream flood records are avail-
able from the USGS gaging station at Willoughby (RK 8)
for the interval 1925-present. Between 1925-1994, the
mean annual discharge was 103 rr^sec1, while the high-
est recorded flow (22 March 1948) was 3750 m3sec:
(ODNR 1987; USGS 1994).
The Chagrin River is a dendritic, meandering stream
that is partly entrenched into bedrock, with a maximum
incision of 90 m deep and 0.8 km wide. Floodplains have
a narrow width, being only 1.8 km at RK 3, 360 m at RK
8, and virtually nonexistent upstream except in meander
loops or at the junction of tributaries. The overall river
slope is 3.0 m/km, having numerous small falls and rapids
in its upper part. The drainage basin geology is dom-
inated by Devonian- and Mississippian-age siliciclastic
sedimentary rocks mantled by Illinoian- and Wisconsin-
age glacial deposits (Banks and Feldman 1970; White
1982). Stream channel and bank sediments are domin-
ated by sand and gravel. Given the relatively steep
gradients, relatively narrow and thin floodplains, and
coarse-grained stream substrates, it is inferred that fine-
grained sediments are transported through the Chagrin
River system, unless they are trapped behind a dam.
History of the Dam
The IVEX dam was constructed in 1842, shortly after
the immediate region was developed by European set-
tlers. The Village of Chagrin Falls was established here in
1833 primarily for its hydropower potential. Numerous
small wooden dams were eventually consolidated into
two larger dams with masonry construction: the Lower
Mill Pond dam and the Upper Mill Pond (IVEX) dam
(Blakeslee 1874). A review of historical land-use changes
in the drainage basin, and the resulting impact on soil
erosion loss and sediment yield, is given elsewhere
(Evans and others 2000a).
The IVEX dam has partially or completely failed five
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FIGURE 1. Map showing A) location of the Chagrin River and study area
in northeastern Ohio, B) location of the Lower Mill Pond and Upper
Mill Pond (IVEX Reservoir) near the Village of Chagrin Falls, and
C) locations of sediment cores in the IVEX Reservoir, and new path of
the incised Chagrin River through the former reservoir.
times during its 152-year life history. Constructed as a
spar dam in 1842, unanchored to bedrock, it suffered
catastrophic toppling failure that same year. Rebuilt im-
mediately, the structure evolved into a masomy spillway
7.4 m tall, 33 m wide, and 1.0 m thick (Fig. 2), which was
attached to bedrock on the west side, and to a 152 m
long earth-fill dam on the east side. The dam failed
completely in 1877, dewatering the reservoir. Because
the owner could not afford to repair it, the reservoir
became pasture land until 1890, when repairs were
completed, and the reservoir reflooded. The IVEX dam
suffered partial failures in 1913 and 1985, due to seepage
piping at the masonry spillway-dam contact. Neither of
these failures completely dewatered the reservoir. The
1985 failure was patched with hydraulic cement (ODNR
1987).
Neither of these dams were constructed with emer-
gency spillways. Both were listed as "Class 1 Dams" by
the Ohio Department of Natural Resources (ODNR), in-
dicating large dams (storage capacity >5000 acre-ft or
height >60 ft) where failure could result in loss of life,
health hazard, or serious property damage (Ohio Revised
Code, Section 1521). Federal authority over the safety
of privately owned dams has grown from safety in-
spections during the 1970s by the US Army Corps of
Engineers (under authority of Public Laws 92-366 and
99-662), to the establishment of the 1996 National Dam
Safety Program (P.L. 104-303, Section 215). The National
Dam Safety Program is administered by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and involves
standardized guidelines for federal dams, grant assistant-
ship to states to train private dam owners or operators,
and a National Dam Safety Review Board to monitor
federal and state efforts.
FIGURE 2. Oldest available photograph of the IVEX dam (about 1870)
showing the masonry spillway attached to bedrock on the west bank
(left) and the earth-fill dam on the east bank (right). Note absence of
trees on the earth-fill dam. The spillway is 7.4 m tall. Photo courtesy
of the Chagrin Falls Historical Society.
In the case of these two dams, the safety inspections
were conducted by the ODNR Division of Water in 1987.
At that time, inspectors were critical of the IVEX dam,
requiring the owners to provide a spillway capable of
passing the PMF of 1640 m3sec\ repair seepage piping
problems, and remove trees from the earth-fill dam. The
PMF discharge was calculated from flood routing, using
the HEC-1 hydrologic model, for a 100-year rainfall
event based upon National Weather Service data (for
example, Huff and Angel 1992). IVEX Corporation
submitted a plan to undertake remedial actions, which
was approved by both DNR Division of Water and the
Army Corps of Engineers, on 23 August 1991. However,
IVEX Corporation then balked at the cost and con-
sidered selling the property, thus delaying implemen-
tation of repairs (Baka 1994). None of the required
actions had been taken when the dam failed on 13
August 1994.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Methods used in this study included field examina-
tion of erosional and depositional features, surveying,
evaluation of the stratigraphy of stream cutbanks and
trenches, and collection of nine 8.0-cm diameter vibra-
cores up to 4.5 m long (see Fig. 1C for core locations).
The cores were split in the laboratory, and one half
archived. The working half was described, photographed,
and sampled for composition, texture, porosity, bulk
density, and geochemical analyses (Gill 1996). Most of
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the core data is presented elsewhere (Evans and others
2000a). Field transects were used for aid in correlation
between cores, to evaluate certain depositional or ero-
sional structures, and to locate historical artifacts used
to calibrate age relationships.
One core (94-IVEX-1A) was selected for 210Pb and
137Cs analysis. Twenty-five samples 1-cm thick were taken
from this core to identify peak concentrations of 137Cs,
which is a bomb-fallout isotope with a 30.2 year half-
life. Because 137Cs does not occur naturally, known
changes in input rates (due to varying numbers of
open-air nuclear tests) can be used to establish the age
of various layers in the sediment. For example peak 137Cs
values occurred in 1963-1964, prior to implementation
of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. 137Cs is strongly adsorbed
to clays, and has been used to calculate soil erosion and
sediment accumulation in drainage basins (Pennington
and others 1973; Ritchie and others 1973; Ritchie and
others 1975; Oldfield and others 1980; Campbell and
others 1982, 1988; McCall and others 1984; Walling and
Bradley 1988; Ritchie and McHenry 1990). 210Pb is a
naturally occurring, daughter product of 222Rn, and is
deposited above land surfaces at an approximately
constant rate by dry fallout. Strongly adsorbed to clays
or organics, 210Pb is transported to lakes and reservoirs
along with the sediment load. Once deposited in the
lake or reservoir, 210Pb decays with a 22.3 year half-life,
permitting calculation of sediment rates and ages of
sediment horizons over the past 150 years (Goldberg
1963; Koide and others 1972; Robbins and Edgington
1975; Robbins 1978; Krishnaswamy and Lai 1978; Evans
and others 1981). Unfortunately, 210Pb geochronology
had limited geochronology value in this study because
of large variations in the rate of supply, which violate
assumptions used for dating purposes (Appleby and
Oldfield 1978). The causes for such variations are changes
in sediment inputs, as might be expected in a small
drainage basin with episodic flood events (for example,
Bloesch and Evans 1982; Binford and Brenner 1986).
210Pb was useful for confirming the age of the oldest
reservoir sediments, among other things, as discussed
more fully elsewhere (Evans and others 2000a). The
activities of 137Cs and 210Pb were determined using low-
background, high-purity, germanium gamma-counting
procedures (EPRI 1996) following Gottgens and others
(1999).
RESULTS
Causes and Characteristics of the Dam Failure
On 13 August 1994 the upper Chagrin River water-
shed experienced 13-54 cm of rainfall within a 24-
hour period, which represents approximately a 70-year
rainfall event based upon National Weather Service data
(Huff and Angel 1992). Prior to failure, flows rose to 1.9
m above the base of the spillway, impinging on the top
of the dam (Larry Rohman, IVEX Corporation, written
communication to the ODNR 1994). Eyewitnesses on
the west bank (spillway side of the dam) took a photo-
graph of the spillway at full flood stage (Fig. 3) just
before failure. Note the presence of logs in the tailrace of
the spillway. It is possible that logs partially obstructed
FIGURE 3- Photograph of the spillway of the IVEX dam minutes be-
fore failure of the dam at the spillway-dam contact (right). Note the
growth of trees on the earth-fill dam. Also note presence of logs in
the tailrace of the spillway. Photo courtesy of Y. Rausch, Chagrin Falls
Historical Society.
the spillway, backing up flow and increasing stage
height, at some critical time prior to failure.
Eyewitnesses on the east bank of the earth-fill dam
reported seeing active gullying on the downstream toe
prior to failure (Randall James, Ohio State University
Agricultural Extension Service, verbal communication,
1999). The origin of these gullies would be the result of
seepage piping, which is sediment erosion due to the
discharge of groundwater. Seepage is a common engin-
eering problem of dams and other hydraulic structures,
and is a function of hydraulic head (reservoir pool
height). In this case, as the reservoir approached maxi-
mum capacity at flood stage, maximum rates of seepage
would be expected to occur. Piping (sediment erosion)
is also a function of hydraulic gradient, and will occur
wherever the upward directed seepage force exceeds
the gravity force (Freeze and Cherry 1979; Haan and
others 1994). Piping can be significant in situations
where drainage pathways exist, such as burrows, cracks,
fractures, and root molds, or where discontinuities exist,
such as impermeable horizons (Dunne 1990). It is highly
probable (although it can not be proven) that seepage
piping was concentrated and more effective in this case
because of the presence of large trees on the dam. Tree
roots and root mold cavities were observed in the
breach of the earth-fill dam after the failure took place.
The IVEX failure resembled other seepage piping
failures. Commonly, the result of seepage piping is even-
tual collapse of the pipe, leading to sudden collapse of
a portion of the crest of the dam and formation of a
breach (for example, MacDonald and Langridge-
Monopolis 1984). The breach permits escape of the
impounded water, which then downcuts to deepen
and widen the breach, thus accelerating the flow rate. In
this case, the breach formed near the contact of the
masonry spillway and earth-fill dam (Fig. 4). This was
the site of previous seepage piping problems, and the
breach exposed the hydraulic patch used to repair the
1985 partial dam failure (Fig. 5).
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FIGURE 4. Photograph of the breach in the dam taken days after the
failure. Note the masonry spillway (left) and earth-fill dam (right).
The hydraulic patch from the 1985 seepage piping failure is exposed
on the left (west) side of the breach. Also note the reservoir sedi-
ments about 4.5 m thick just behind the spillway.
Paleohydrologic modeling of peak discharge in dam
failures is notoriously difficult and inaccurate, given
transient flow conditions and the inability to measure
certain parameters. Improvements to these models have
included a more theoretical approach stressing relation-
ships between dimensionless parameters for peak dis-
charge, reservoir drainage, breach formation, and other
factors (for example, Walder and O'Connor 1997). In
this case, our surveys allowed calculation of the volume
of water flowing through the breach (Vo = 38,000
m3), the breach dimensions (being a trapezoid 12.4 m
wide at the base, 20.0 m wide at the top, and 7.5 m
tall), and the erosion rate of breach formation (a con-
servative estimate from eyewitness accounts is k = 15
mhr1). Using the methods of Walder and O'Connor
(1997), two dimensionless parameters can be calculated,
dimensionless parameter h = 2.7, and the dimensionless
peak discharge Q * = 1.2. Solving the relevant equations
L. '•
for these dimensionless values allows calculation of
peak discharge through the breach of Q = 466 mlsec1.
The reservoir was substantially dewatered (this ignores
stream discharge that continued to enter the reservoir
from upstream) in a time range equal to 2V/Q , or
about 2.72 minutes. These values are reasonably equiva-
lent to the small number of well documented failures
in reservoirs of similar size (Walder and O'Connor 1997).
Downstream Effects
Downstream effects due to the dam failure included
flooding, hydraulic damage (erosion), and sedimenta-
tion. Immediately downstream of the breach was a
wide debris fan (Fig. 6) that extended over 1 km down-
stream into the reservoir of the Lower Mill Pond. Flood
debris suggested that the height of the floodwave was
approximately 1.5 m above bankfull depth (about 0.5
m), at a point about 200 m downstream of the spillway.
The floodwave crossed the Lower Mill Pond (note, the
entire length of this dam is a masonry spillway), and
continued downstream. Extensive erosional damage was
done to stream banks and culverts, and the causeway
of the State Route 87 was inundated at a point about
7.0 km downstream of the breach. Note that most of the
damage (for example, streambank erosion and deposi-
tion) is not easily quantifiable.
FIGURE 5. Close-up of the breach, showing the 1985 hydraulic patch
and plug. Note gullying in the exposed reservoir sediments to the
right background.
FIGURE 6. View downstream from the IVEX dam showing the debris-fan,
bank erosion, and undercutting of mature trees resulting from the dam
failure. The Chagrin River meanders to the right in this photo, and the
flow crossed old chute channels on that point bar surface.
The Ohio Geological Survey's inspection of the IVEX
reservoir following the dam failure revealed that the
structure trapped about 236,000 m3 of fine-grained sedi-
ment during its 152-year history. The dam failure and
subsequent downcutting by the Chagrin River mobilized
between 23,700 - 31,300 m3 of sediment (9-13% of the
original reservoir fill). It is difficult to separate the two
processes (breaching and incision) because incision
proceeded rapidly after breaching. However, it should
be pointed out that the source of most of the sediment
was due to incision, as the Chagrin River re-established
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its hydraulic gradient across the reservoir. Of this volume
of remobilized sediment, between 19,100 - 26,800 m3
(61-86%) was deposited in the downstream reservoir
or Lower Mill Pond (Ohio Geological Survey, written
communication 1994), and the addition of large volumes
of fine-grained sediment to the downstream reservoir
raised significant concerns about its safety (Baka 1994).
The remaining between 3,820 - 5,350 m3 (14-39%) was
deposited in the "floodplain" between the two reservoirs,
which is actually chute channels in a meander loop
(Ohio Geological Survey, written communication 1994).
It is a concern that the continued erosion of sediment
of the IVEX reservoir could accelerate the storage ca-
pacity loss of the downstream reservoir.
Damage Within the Reservoir
Flood effects within the IVEX reservoir include ero-
sion that occurred during the dam failure (Fig. 7), de-
FIGURE 7. View of longitudinal scours produced in the reservoir due
to escaping floodwaters after the dam breach. Person for scale
(center background).
watering and subsidence of the muddy reservoir fill
(Fig. 8), and slumping of the poorly consolidated res-
ervoir sediments into the new channel of the Chagrin
River (Fig. 9). Incision exposed bedrock cutbanks of
the pre-reservoir channel (Fig. 10), white cedar stumps
from the pre-1842 floodplain (Fig. 11), the upstream
delta infilling the reservoir (Fig. 12), and examples of
rhythmically-bedded, fining-upward sequences
representing sequential floods over the interval 1842-
1994 (Fig. 13). Core data could be used to identify
specific flood horizons (Fig. 14), and calculate changes
in sediment accumulation rates that occurred in the
reservoir. These sedimentation rates, and corresponding
changes in land-use and sediment conveyance within
the drainage basin, are discussed in detail in Evans and
others (2000a).
A number of studies have shown the importance of
stabilizing the fine-grained reservoir sediment fill to
prevent excessive sediment loadings downstream. For
example, preliminary studies for proposed deliberate
*.
FIGURE 8. Compaction and desiccation of the fine-grained reservoir sedi-
ments following the dewatering of the reservoir. Shovel is 45 cm long.
decommissioning of certain dams have shown that re-
leases of fine-grained sediment would adversely impact
water quality, change stream chemistry, modify substrate,
FIGURE 9. Significant slumping of the water-saturated reservoir sedi-
ments into the newly incised channel of the Chagrin River as it adjusts
to breaching of the dam and changes in longitudinal profile.
oinojoi'KNAi. ()!• SCIF.NCF. J. E. EVANS AND OTHERS 127
FIGURE 10. Bedrock outcrop exposed due to incision of the Chagrin
River following breaching of the dam. This outcrop represents a bed-
rock valley wall of the pre-reservoir channel, being exhumed by recent
incision.
or damage fisheries (Simons and others 1989; FERC
199D- In this case, observations in the days following
the failure indicated that the Chagrin River rapidly in-
cised to within a meter of the bedrock surface underlying
the valley. At this point, the stream began to migrate
FIGURE 12. New outcrop showing the delta at the upstream end of
the reservoir. This deltaic distributary mouth bar consists of sand- and
gravel-foresets with climbing ripple lamination. Shovel is 45 cm long.
laterally, however flow along the western side of the
reservoir was already confined by bedrock valley
walls. The threat is lateral channel migration eastward
through the reservoir fill, which would erode these
fine-grained materials.
FIGURE 11. White Cedar stump from the pre-1842 floodplain forest,
flooded and killed by the reservoir, and now exhumed by the dam
failure. Shovel for scale is 45 cm.
FIGURE 13. Trench exposure of the reservoir sediments showing flood
rhythmites (repetitive, fining-upward sequences of sand, silt, and clay
with capping organic-rich laminae). Shovel is 1.5 m tall.
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FIGURE 14. Data from core 94-IVEX-1A showing the core strati-
graphy, activity of U7Cs and activity of 210Pb. A full discussion of
assignment of ages to specific intervals is given elsewhere (Evans
and others 1999A).
Storage Capacity Loss
The initial storage capacity of the IVEX Reservoir was
estimated as 274,000 m3 based upon historical data
(ODNR 1987), field surveying by the Ohio Geological
Survey, and our core data. Permanent pool capacity
loss by time of dam failure was 86%, representing an
annual storage capacity loss of 0.62% per year over the
152-year history of the structure (note: the 13 years be-
tween 1877-1890 are excluded from the calculation
because the reservoir was dewatered at that time).
These numbers are typical for reservoirs throughout the
United States (Dendy and Champion 1978). Our core data
permitted evaluation of capacity loss at specific time in-
tervals, showing that annual loss rates varied from 0.37%
per year to 1.72% per year (Table 1). This range of
values is related to changing land-use practices within
the drainage basin (which increased or decreased soil
erosion rates) and also changing sediment conveyance
rates due to episodic floods (Evans and others 2000a).
A question of interest is the sediment budget for this
watershed. A sediment budget consists of input (soil
erosion), intrabasinal storage (deposition of alluvium or
colluvium within the basin), and output (sediment
yield, or the amount of sediment that leaves the water-
shed). An evaluation of soil erosion in the upstream
drainage basin can be achieved using the Universal
Soil Loss Equation (USLE). This procedure calculates
soil loss (in mass per unit area) for specific types of
land use, soil type, vegetation cover, slope angle, slope
length, and rainfall intensity. Given the mix of such
variables for the upstream drainage basin, we calculate
upstream USLE soil loss of about 19,100 metric tons yr1
for the IVEX reservoir.
The sediment yield can be obtained by calculating
the mass of sediment in the reservoir, as corrected for
the trapping efficiency of the dam. In order to convert
sediment volume to mass, the volume must first be
corrected for compaction (obtained from core data, this
varies with depth, and averages about 30%), and multi-
plied by bulk density (rb = 1,620 kg m~3). Accordingly,
the total mass of sediment in the reservoir was found to
be 246,000 metric tons, or an annual loading of 1,770
metric tons yr1 (again, years 1877-1890 are excluded
from the calculation). The trapping efficiency of the
IVEX dam is estimated at 67%, based upon the com-
parison of the sediment load trapped in the IVEX
reservoir versus the lower reservoir, and the approxi-
mately 90% trapping efficiency of both structures acting
together. Thus, the sediment yield indicated by the
IVEX reservoir is 2,350 metric tons yr1 and the sedi-
ment delivery ratio (sediment yield divided by soil
erosion rate) is 12.3%. This figure is bracketed by em-
pirical calculations based upon other reservoirs (9-6%
according to the method of Brune 1953) and studies on
soil erosion rates (15% according to the method of
Boyce 1975). These numbers indicate that most (87.7%)
of detached soil particles are deposited in the basin as
intrabasinal storage pending increases in sediment
conveyance rates, such as major storms (Evans and
others 2000a). Field observations indicate significant
colluvium storage in this region.
DISCUSSION
A dam failure offers numerous instructive lessons. The
first is conceptual—the recognition that dams are, in
fact, unnatural and short-term features in a landscape.
Theoretically, a well-designed and well-maintained
dam can be operated indefinitely. In practice, thousands
of the oldest dams in the US were not designed using
modern hydrological principles. In these cases, the com-
bined effect of storage capacity loss, inadequate spillway
design, and lack of emergency spillways can convert
dams and reservoirs from flood control assets to lia-
bilities. For such dams, the life expectancy is a function
of its storage capacity loss, and thus a dam is con-
sidered at the end of its useful life when about 60%
storage capacity loss occurs (Hahn 1955). Given typical
loss rates of 0.5-1.0% storage capacity loss per year,
these older dams have an average life history of about
60-120 years (Hahn 1955; Dendy and Champion 1978).
The magnitude of the problem becomes apparent
when considering that, by 2020, greater than 85% of
the dams in the US will be near the end of their opera-
tional lives (FEMA 1999). Many of the older dams were
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TABLE 1
IVEX reservoir storage capacity loss.
Years Record
Interval Thickness (m)
% Core Length
Interval Porosity
Decompacted Interval Thickness (m)
Interval Sediment Volume (103 m1)
Interval Storage Capacity Loss (%)
Annual Storage Capacity Loss (%)
Sedimentation Rate (cm yr')
Mass Sedimentation Rate (g cm"2 yr1)
1842-
1877
35
0.98
32.1
0.45
1.64
103
60.3
1.72
4.69
4.68
1890-
1913
23
0.32
10.5
0.50
0.48
14.7
8.6
0.37
2.09
2.58
1913-
1931
18
0.41
13.4
0.55
0.56
35.4
20.6
1.14
3.11
3.81
1931-
1948
17
0.33
10.9
0.57
0.44
27.7
16.1
0.95
2.59
3.27
1948-
1959
11
0.28
9.0
0.59
0.35
22.3
12.9
1.18
3.18
4.19
1959-
1969
10
0.27
8.9
0.62
0.33
20.7
12.0
1.21
3.30
4.55
1969-
1989
20
0.32
10.4
0.64
0.37
23.6
13.7
0.69
1.85
2.65
1989-
1994
5
0.14
4.7
0.70
0.15
9.7
5.6
1.12
3.00
4.77
originally built for hydropower, and were later con-
verted for different purposes. This may or may not
impact dam safety, but in the case of the IVEX dam such
conversion (hydropower to water supply) appears to
coincide with less active dam maintenance. This was
manifested in growth of trees on the earth-fill dam,
untended seepage problems on the dam and spillway,
and poor maintenance of drains and other structures
(ODNR Division of Water 1987).
A second lesson is that dam failures represent more
than one threat of damage. The most obvious threat is
the floodwave generated by sudden breaching of the
dam. This can result in direct damage due to sub-
mergence, hydraulic damage, and loss of life or property
damage. A less obvious threat is sedimentation, due to
the mobilization of the fine-grained sediment trapped
in the upstream reservoir. In the case of the IVEX failure,
the most serious damage downstream, long-term, is the
influx of fine-grained sediment into the downstream
reservoir. In other words, in this case failure of an up-
stream structure threatens the integrity of a downstream
structure.
A particular problem facing the dam owners, regula-
tory agencies, and local population following a dam
failure is whether or not to rebuild the structure. This is
an expensive proposition, because breaching failure
can undermine all of the structure, requiring removal
of the surviving portions of the dam prior to rebuilding.
The cost of rebuilding the IVEX dam was estimated at
$1-2.5 million. However, site remediation poses signifi-
cant problems even if the dam is not rebuilt. The major
problem is how to stabilize the fine-grained reservoir
sediments to prevent siltation problems downstream. In
the case of the IVEX dam, an experimental program is
taking place to convert the former reservoir into a
riparian wetland, and use plant growth to stabilize the
reservoir muds (Evans and others 2000b).
A final lesson from a dam failure is that they are
opportunities to recover significant information about
the effect of humans on a landscape. Dewatered reser-
voirs are exceptional geological laboratories to recover
information and artifacts giving insights to the historical
development and changes in the watershed, and to in-
teractions between human activities and hydrological,
geological, and ecological change. It is not only possible
to evaluate the magnitude of changes from pre-settlement
times until today, but also to consider choices about
future conditions. A dam failure forces recognition that,
despite their longevity in human terms, these structures
are short-term features in the landscape.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The failure of the IVEX dam on 13 August 1994 should
have been anticipated, given its age, storage capacity
loss, and history of management problems. Older dams,
with inadequate primary spillways and lack of emer-
gency spillways, are vulnerable to failure due to storage
capacity loss due to sedimentation. An evaluation of
core data shows that storage capacity loss varied from
0.37% to 1.72% per year, culminating in 86% storage
capacity loss over the 152-year history of the dam. It is
widely accepted that 60% storage capacity loss terminates
the usefulness of such dams and reservoirs, and con-
verts a dam from an asset to a flood control liability.
The IVEX dam failure was the result of seepage piping
problems that had been recurrent over a long interval
of time. Simple management practices, such as clearing
the dam of trees or screening the spillway from large
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logs, were not followed. The spillway design was in-
adequate, and there was no emergency spillway. Data
from FEMA show that many thousands of dams in the
US suffer from lack of maintenance or adequate moni-
toring. Ironically in this case, the vulnerability of the
structure was accurately predicted in a dam safety in-
spection seven years prior to failure, but no remedial
action was taken. This suggests that lack of enforcement
may be a significant problem for dam safety.
The dam breach resulted in a floodwave that had
stage height of at least 1.5 m above bankfull depth at
a distance about 200 m downstream of the dam, and a
peak discharge of about 466 m^sec1. The flood caused
hydraulic damage, flooding, and sedimentation problems
downstream. The floodwave entered and crossed a
downstream reservoir, and caused notable erosion and
inundation damage 7.0 km downstream. However, the
most serious problem was not the flood itself, but long-
term effects of release of fine-grained sediment formerly
impounded behind the dam. There are no simple solu-
tions to sediment management, although in this case an
experiment is being conducted to remediate the former
reservoir as a riparian wetland, using aquatic vegetation
to stabilize the reservoir sediments. Dam failures offer
both problems and opportunities, and force recognition
on the transient nature of dams, and their liabilities as
well as benefits.
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